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Jean BodIn and The romance of demonology
Jean bodin y la novela de la deMonología
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aBsTracT
This article proposes a comparison between the French Renaissance demonologist 
Jean Bodin and the fictional character Don Quijote. Like the hero of  Cervantes’ novel, 
Bodin believes everything he reads. Consequently, Bodin makes his own discipline 
of  demonology a species of  romance that eagerly blurs the boundary of  fact and 
fiction. This type of  credulity can be usefully juxtaposed to Michel de Montaigne’s 
understanding of  the imagination and to his more philosophical exploration of  the 
realm of  possibility.
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resumen
Estas páginas proponen una comparación entre Jean Bodin, demonólogo francés del 
siglo XVI, y don Quijote como personaje de ficción. Al igual que el héroe de la novela 
de Cervantes, Bodin da credibilidad a todo aquello que lee y, en consecuencia, con-
vierte su propia disciplina, la demonología, en una forma de novela que desdibuja de 
manera consciente las fronteras entre hecho y ficción. Ambas formas de credulidad 
pueden compararse de manera productiva a las ideas de Michel de Montaigne acerca 
de la imaginación y a su incursión filosófica en el dominio de lo posible.
palaBras clave: Demonología, ficción, imaginación, Jean Bodin, Michel de Mon-
taigne, Miguel de Cervantes
This paper explores an unsuspected connection between the novelist Miguel 
de Cervantes and the late sixteenth-century French prose writer Jean Bodin. Bodin 
is a perplexing figure, equally renowned as a pioneering advocate of  religious 
tolerance and as a fanatical persecutor of  witches. He occupies a prominent place 
in the history of  political thought for his Six books of  the Republic, and he attempted 
his own synthesis of  natural philosophy in the Theatrum universae naturae. Rarely is 
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he associated with questions of  literary genre and even more rarely is he compared 
to the protagonist of  Cervantes’ novel Don Quijote. What interests me here is 
the quijotismo or attitude to narrative that informs the French author’s treatise on 
witchcraft, De la Démonomanie des sorciers, which was first published in 1580, 25 
years before part one of  Cervantes’ novel. More specifically, I am interested in 
how Bodin appeals to the same arguments in order to defend his belief  in witches 
as Don Quijote does to defend his belief  in chivalric romance. Both men make 
their profession of  faith in defiance of  all those annoying critics who draw a firm 
distinction between fact and fiction. This affinity between the demonologist and 
the hero of  the novel emerges most conspicuously if  we compare the discussion 
between Don Quijote and the Canon of  Toledo in chapter 49 of  the first part of  
the novel with the chapter on lycanthropy in book two of  the Démonomanie. We 
will begin with the Spanish text, in despite of  chronology, which is one of  the 
conventions that convince Don Quijote of  the truth of  fiction.
At the end of  Part I of  Cervantes’ novel, the hero is escorted home in a cage 
by the priest and the barber of  his village, who enact an elaborate charade in order 
to convince the knight that he has fallen victim to an evil enchanter. Thus the 
episode presupposes from the outset the proximity of  belief  in sorcery and belief  
in romance. En route, the travelers encounter a Canon of  Toledo whose curiosity 
is excited by the spectacle of  the encaged knight, whose confidence he gains by 
assuring him that he knows more about books of  chivalry than he does about 
theological treatises (Cervantes 563). After warming up with a preliminary verbal 
skirmish with the priest, the Canon engages, out of  compassion, to dissuade Don 
Quijote from reading chivalric romances. Such reading, he fears, has convinced the 
gullible knight to put his faith in things that are as far from being true as falsehood 
itself  is removed from the truth: “Es possible, señor hidalgo, que haya podido 
tanto con vuestra merced la amarga y ociosa letura de los libros de caballerías, que 
le hayan vuelto el juicio de modo que venga a creer que va encantado, con otras 
cosas deste jaez tan lejos de ser verdaderas como lo está la mesma mentira de la 
verdad?” (Id. 580). Here the categories of  verdad and mentira stand for the literary 
genres of  history and fiction. Rather than books of  chivalry, which ought in his 
opinion to be burned like heretics (Id. 581), the Canon recommends another 
type of  reading: he urges Don Quijote to read the valiant deeds recorded “en la 
Sacra Escritura” (Ibid.) and “en la historia” (Id. 582). These books are true while 
romances lie. No sooner is he out of  his cage than our hero makes short work of  
all these caviling distinctions between different kinds of  narrative. Offended by the 
Canon’s “blasphemies” (Id. 583), the knight appeals insidiously to verisimilitude: 
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how can you deny what is so widely believed and held to be true? If  Amadis is a 
fiction, he declares indignantly, then so are Hector, Achilles and the Trojan War; 
so is King Arthur, so are Tristan and Isolde, Lancelot and Guinevere (Id. 583-84). 
So far so good for the Canon, since we are inclined to classify all these names 
as fictional characters, although we may recall that in the terms of  Aristotle’s 
Poetics, which is supposed to inform the Canon’s critical position (Forcione), the 
names from the tragic and epic tradition are historical names, not fictional ones. 
In chapter nine of  the Poetics, Aristotle allows that, whereas comic poets generally 
assign their characters arbitrary or fictional names (tuchonta onomata 1451b13), 
tragic poets still prefer real names or genomena onomata (1451b15), a phrase which 
the Renaissance commentator Francesco Robortello glosses as “vera personarum 
nomina” (Robortello 93). Aristotle has earlier identified ta genomena or the facts as 
the province of  the historian (1451b4). Frank Walbank offers a pungent comment 
on Aristotle’s distinction between comic and tragic names: “By real names he 
means of  course the names of  real people like Agamemnon and Orestes; and 
what they did has been defined as history” (Walbank 231). In this respect, Don 
Quijote is merely revising Aristotelian logic in keeping with the romance tradition 
when he appeals to the reality of  Achilles and King Arthur.
As he continues his catalogue of  chivalric heroes, Don Quijote veers from 
fiction to history, citing a litany of  characters whom the diligent editor assures 
us were historical personages or caballeros historicos (Cervantes 584, n. 22). This 
category includes the hero’s own ancestor Gutierre Quijada, whose historicity is 
contaminated by his genealogy. Don Quijote rounds off  his eclectic list with a 
defiant challenge to the Canon to deny these Spanish heroes if  he dares, suggesting 
that their debate is itself  a kind of  chivalric contest. This conflation of  genres 
leaves the Canon stunned: “Admirado quedó el canónigo de oír la mezcla que 
don Quijote hacía de verdades y mentiras” (Id. 585). Such an amazing confusion 
of  fact and fiction, based on an implicit faith in the homogeneity of  narrative 
or the idea that all stories are true, may strike a chord of  recognition in readers 
of  Bodin’s treatise on witchcraft De la Démonomanie des sorciers, which reduces its 
audience to a similar state of  confusion with the stunning range of  testimony 
convoked in favor of  its preposterous claims. In fact the Canon, in a momentary 
concession to his interlocutor, may be said to summarize Bodin’s relation to the 
facts when he acknowledges “todo puede ser” (Id. 586) or anything’s possible.
In the debate on sorcery that developed in sixteenth-century Europe, Jean Bodin 
occupies an eccentric, extremist position. For him, the literal reality of  sorcery is 
confirmed by an indiscriminate mass of  narrative precedents, that is of  stories about 
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witches, treated as testimony admissible in court. This tendency to treat all stories 
as proof  becomes most infuriating in the chapter of  the Démonomanie devoted to 
lycanthropy or the transformation of  human beings into wolves through demonic 
agency. The devil does some strange things, but the most difficult thing to believe 
is the metamorphosis of  a human being into an animal. And yet, you can’t argue 
with the proof: “Toutesfois les procés faicts aux Sorciers et les histoires Divines 
et humaines, et de tous les peuples font la preuve tres-certaine” (Bodin 247). To 
prove the existence of  werewolves, Bodin starts with the witch trials, then moves 
on to the demonologists, the retailers of  miracles, and other compilers, before 
taking a quick turn through the historians. All this lycanthropy may be strange, 
Bodin is willing to admit, but what is even stranger is incredulity in the face of  
such universal testimony: “Or c’est chose bien estrange, mais je trouve encores plus 
estrange, que plusieurs ne le peuvent croire, veu que tous les peuples de la terre, et 
toute l’antiquité demeure d’accord” (Id. 251). To drive home his point, he inserts 
a quixotic litany of  authorities: Herodotus, Homer, Pomponius Mela, Solinus, 
Strabo, Marcus Varro, Virgil, Ovid, Pliny, Olaus Magnus, Saxo Grammaticus, Job 
Fincel, and Guillaume de Brabant (Id. 251–252). This is Bodin’s most compact 
version of  “la mezcla de verdades y mentiras” with which Don Quijote stuns the 
Canon. However, Bodin seems to draw the line, a line he has already crossed, at 
Ovid: “Je laisse la metamorphose d’Ovide par ce qu’il a entremellé la verité de 
plusieurs fables” (Id. 252–253). You have to take Ovid with a grain of  salt because 
he mixed truth and fable (a little like Bodin himself  and his epigone Don Quijote). 
Nevertheless, though the Metamorphoses may contaminate truth with fable, the myth 
of  Lycaon, surely, is not incredible: “mais il n’est pas incroyable ce qu’il escript de 
Lycaon Roy d’Arcadie” (Id. 253). Similarly, what Homer says about Circe is not a 
fable because St. Augustine tells the same story in his City of  God. All of  this is in 
cruelly bad faith, but the use he makes of  St. Augustine is the most devious.
Augustine begins book 18 of  his City of  God by announcing that he will now 
review the history of  the city of  man from Abraham to the Incarnation, through 
a sort of  concordance of  Biblical history and pagan history. For instance, the 
reign of  the Hebrew judges coincided roughly with the Trojan War, during which, 
incidentally, Diomedes’ men were turned into birds (Augustine 276). This leads 
to an interesting novelistic digression on metamorphosis, drawing on examples 
compiled by Marcus Varro, including the episode of  Circe in Homer,1 and various 
1 For Peter Bietenholz (154-157), the episode of  Circe is a key test case for the emerging 
distinction between history and fable in the modern era.
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 4, n.º 2 (2017): 265-276
Jean Bodin and the Romance of  Demonology 269
incidents of  lycanthropy among the Arcadians. In the following chapter, chapter 
18 of  book 18, the self-conscious narrator remarks that his readers may wonder 
what he thinks about all this transformation from human to animal form: “Sed 
de ista tanta ludificatione daemonum nos quid dicamus, qui haec legent, fortassis 
expectent” (Id. 277). Does he believe in any of  it? The short answer is no: “Haec 
vel falsa sunt vel tam inusitata, ut merito non credantur” (Id. 278). These stories, 
he asserts, are all false or at least so strange, inusitata, that they should not be 
believed. And yet, the Christian must believe that nothing is impossible for God: 
“Firmissime tamen credendum est omnipotentem Deum posse omnia facere quae 
voluerit,” a confession that once more blurs the boundary between fact and fiction. 
Augustine will never believe that demons literally change the human body or soul, 
but rather that they deceive the human imagination, which he calls “phantasticum 
hominis” (Ibid.). In this sense, the stories of  metamorphosis, when recounted 
by credible authorities, which seems to include Homer but exclude Apuleius,2 
are at least possible if  not factual. So, all the stories told in book 18, chapters 17 
and 18 of  the City of  God testify to the power of  the imagination, which tends to 
merge with divine omnipotence as the dual guarantors of  lycanthropy and other 
metamorphoses.
So this is Bodin’s authority for asserting as a fact the reality of  lycanthropy, 
which he doggedly defends by analogy to other notorious cases of  metamorphosis. 
Bodin is cheered by the stories he has read of  witches who transform their victims 
into animals, generally asses, and he generously invents an anecdote of  a trained 
ass and former human that he attributes to Pierre Belon (Bodin 253). He is most 
captivated by the Golden Ass or Metamorphoses of  Apuleius, which he takes to 
be some sort of  autobiography rather than a work of  fiction. He eagerly cites, 
from book one, Aristomenes’ dubious protestation of  veracity, that bears a strong 
resemblance to and may indeed be a model of  Maître Alcofrybas’ strident claim 
to veracity in the prologue to Rabelais’ Pantagruel. Whereas Aristomenes swears by 
the all-seeing sun to tell nothing but the truth: “sed tibi prius deierabo solem istum 
<omni>videntem deum me vera comperta memorare” (Metamorphoses I, 5 cited 
in Bodin 254), Alcofrybas swears an even more aggressive oath of  veracity: “je 
me donne à mille panerés de beaulx diables, corps et âmes, trippes et boyaulx, en 
cas que j’en mente en toute l’hystoire d’un seul mot” (Rabelais 216). It’s a wonder 
Bodin doesn’t cite Alcofrybas as an authority on the demonic, but he may have 
2 “Sicut Apuleius in libris, quos Asini aurei titulo inscripsit, sibi ipsi accidisse aut indicavit aut 
finxit” (Augustine 278).
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resented Rabelais’ obvious parody of  verisimilitude.3 Bodin has a moment of  
lucidity when he admits that Apuleius may have embellished his history with some 
tall tales, but surely the story is no stranger than all the other lies he’s swallowed 
whole: “Il se peult faire qu’il a enrichy son histoire de quelques contes plaisans, mais 
l’histoire en soy n’est pas plus estrange, que celles que nous avons remarquées” 
(Bodin 254). Estrange in this context seems to mean inverisimilar/invraisemblable, 
and Apuleius defines the outer limit of  verisimilitude, beyond which literature 
dare not go. Apuleius is in effect Bodin’s Amadis de Gaula, the work of  fiction that 
he alone takes as fact.
Whereas Don Quijote had the good sense for a madman to mix only secular 
facts and fiction, Bodin insists on enlisting the authority of  Biblical narrative 
to support his argument. King Nebuchadnezzar in the Book of  Daniel sets the 
precedent for metamorphosis and thus for lycanthropy. If  you believe one, you 
have to believe the other. “Et si nous confessons la verité de l’histoire sacree en 
Daniel, qui ne peut estre revoquee en doute, il est certain que le changement 
d’homme en Boeuf  est possible, il est possible en tous autres animaux” (Bodin 
259). Conversely, if  you don’t believe in werewolves, or if  you think it’s all an 
illusion, you better not believe in the Bible: “Car qui voudroit pour une illusion 
conclure que tout n’est qu’illusion des oeuvres de Sathan, il faudroit confesser que 
tout ce qu’il fist à Job ne seroient que illusions. Et la saincte Escriture, et toutes 
les Histoires de telles chose ne seroient que mocqueries” (Id. 258, n. 61). This is 
the type of  pious reasoning that has strengthened Bodin’s reputation for atheism.4
Bodin stakes out such an extreme position in the contemporary debate 
on sorcery in response to the work of  the Flemish physician Johan Wier, who 
debunks the wild imaginings of  the witch hunters in his De praestigiis daemonum, first 
published in five books in 1563 and expanded to six books in 1568. Apparently 
the confusion of  fact and fiction that we find in Bodin was already quite current in 
1563, for Wier devotes a chapter to the poetic authorities conventionally invoked 
by demonologists as evidence in their case against witches. Book two, chapter 17 in 
the first edition purports to define “quid sit Lamia” but is in fact an anthology of  
verse depictions of  witches from Ovid, Virgil, Homer, Horace, Tibullus, Lucan, 
Manilius, and even the modern Macaronic poets. If  you think those are lies, Wier 
remarks, you haven’t seen anything until you’ve read Apuleius, whose book is 
3 For which, see Rigolot and also MacPhail.
4 François Berriot offers a handy survey of  Bodin’s reputation for heterodoxy in his 
introduction to Bodin’s Colloque entre sept scavans.
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stuffed with infinite histories, more fabulous than fables: “At apud haec poetarum 
commenta locum merentur infinitae historiae, fabulis fabulosiores, XI libris 
Metamorphoseos sive lusus asini conscriptae a L. Apuleio philosopho platonico” 
(Wier 178). In the phrase fabulis fabulosiores, we have a nice hyperbolic formula that 
seems to respond to Erasmus’ adage vero verior. In fact the formula comes from 
Apuleius himself  in book one of  the Metamorphoses where the narrator encounters 
two travelers who are disputing an account of  witchcraft. The traveler named 
Aristomenes gives a breathless account of  his own harrowing encounter with a 
witch while his anonymous interlocutor and fellow traveler tells him to lay off  the 
enormous lies: “parce in verba ista haec tam absurda tamque immania mentiendo” 
(Metamorphoses I, 2). The credulous narrator naturally sides with Aristomenes 
and asks him to retell his story, which elicits from his comes or companion the 
categorical verdict, “nihil hac fabula fabulosius, nihil isto mendacio absurdius” 
(I, 20). To bolster their respective positions, Bodin cites the credulous traveler 
and his oath to the sun and Wier alleges the scornful words of  the incredulous 
traveler: “Nae istud mendacium tam verum est, quam si quis velit dicere, magico 
susurramine amnes agiles reverti… noctem teneri” (Met I, 3 cited in Wier 179). In 
effect Apuleius has already staged the Renaissance debate over witchcraft at the 
outset of  his novel.
The publication of  the Démonomanie in 1580 provoked mixed reactions 
including ridicule and indignation as well as some astonishment.5 Reginald Scot’s 
The Discovery of  Witchcraft from 1584 sides openly with Wier against Bodin. 
Chapter seven of  book twelve, entitled “Poetical Authorities commonly alleged by 
Witchmongers,” basically replicates the florilegium of  verse from the De praestigiis 
daemonum (II, 17). In the following chapter, XII, 8, Scot makes clear where his 
sympathies lie:
You see in these verses, the Poets (whether in earnest or in jest, I know not) 
ascribe unto Witches and to their charms, more than is to be found in Humane or 
Diabolical power. I doubt not but the most part of  the Readers hereof  will admit 
them to be fabulous; although the most learned of  mine adversaries (for lack of  
Scripture) are fain to produce these Poetries for proofs, and for lack of  judgment, 
I am sure, do think that Actaeon’s transformation was true. And why not as well as 
the Metamorphosis or Transubstantiation of  Ulysses his companions into Swine, 
which S. Augustine and so many great Clerks credit and report? (Scot 129)
5 The contemporary reception of  Bodin’s work has been ably summarized by Françoise 
Lavocat, who confirms Bodin’s isolated position even in his own credulous era. 
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In fact Scot is too hard on Augustine, who, despite Bodin’s willful misreading, 
reports without crediting the episode of  Circe in Homer’s Odyssey under the chapter 
heading “De incredibilibus commutationibus hominum quid Varro tradiderit” 
(Augustine 276). However, he’s not too hard on Bodin, who doesn’t hesitate to 
credit the strangest fictions of  antiquity.
Some years later Jean de Nynauld published a work on lycanthropy whose title 
page clarifies the author’s poor esteem for Jean Bodin.
De la Lycanthropie, transformation et extase des sorciers, où les astuces du 
diable sont mises tellement en évidence, qu’il est presque impossible, voire aux 
plus ignorants, de se laisser dorénavant séduire. Avec la réfutation des arguments 
contraires, que Bodin allègue au 6. chap. du second livre de sa Démonomanie, pour 
soutenir la réalité de cette prétendue transformation d’hommes en bêtes.
Bodin, nearly alone among his peers, espouses the “realist” position in regard 
to lycanthropy (Lavocat 68), relying on literary precedents and the omnipotence 
of  God to prove the reality of  werewolves. Nynauld draws out the implications 
of  this logic. If  we say that anything is possible because God is omnipotent, 
then we’ll have to accept lies for truth: “s’il falloit croire toutes choses pource 
que toutes choses sont possibles à Dieu, Certes toute science nous seroit ostée, 
d’autant que nous serions comme contraincts à croire les choses, voire les plus 
estranges, et le plus souvent prendre le mensonge pour la verité” (Nynauld 77-78). 
For Nynauld, writing in the immediate aftermath of  the first French translation 
of  Cervantes’ novel Don Quijote by César Oudin in 1614, it is crucial to distinguish 
between fact and fiction. Thus he stands in relation to Bodin, as the Canon of  
Toledo does to Don Quijote.
Finally, Gabriel Naudé made a decisive intervention in this debate in 1624 when 
he published his Apologie pour tous les grands personnages qui ont esté faussement soupçonnez 
de magie. In chapter 11 he unmasks the treachery of  “nos Demonographes” who 
discount historical testimony but use the Metamorphoses of  Apuleius as if  it were 
a history to prove lycanthropy, even though Apuleius takes every precaution to 
tell us that he’s writing a fiction or rather “une pure fable et Romant” (Naudé 
246). With this phrase, Naudé adapts Apuleius’ own generic designation of  sermo 
Milesius to the modern genre of  the novel, which is not bound by the same generic 
conventions as history. Later, at the end of  his book, Naudé returns to the willful 
confusion of  narrative genres in the work of  the demonologists. He finds it 
strange that Bodin and his colleagues refuse to distinguish fact from fiction:
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Et à la verité c’est une chose estrange que Delrio, le Loyer, Bodin, de Lancre, 
Godelman qui ont esté ou sont encores personnes de credit et de merite, ayent 
escrit si passionnément sur le sujet des Demons, Sorciers et Magiciens, que de 
n’avoir iamais rebutté aucune histoire, quoy que fabuleuse et ridicule de tout ce 
grand nombre de fausses et absurdes qu’ils ont peslemeslé sans discretion parmy 
les vrayes et legitimes. (Naudé 608[642])
Here, with the help of  the neologism peslemesler, Naudé renders exactly the 
Canon of  Toledo’s reaction to Don Quijote’s fantastic “mezcla de verdades y 
mentiras.” But Naudé doesn’t seem to worry about the triumph of  credulity 
and the ruin of  science, like Nynauld. Rather, it is demonology that will lose all 
credibility due to its indiscriminate use of  sources. Naudé invokes the authority 
of  St. Augustine to buttress his argument that lies will discredit the truth: “solent 
res gestae aspersione mendaciorum in fabulas verti” (De civitate dei VII, 35 cited 
in Naudé 609[643]). He even appeals to Aesop’s fable of  the boy who cried 
wolf, which is an underhanded reference to Bodin’s obsession with lycanthropy. 
Eventually, he insinuates, we will learn to read the Démonomanie as a work of  fiction.
As epilogue, I would like to briefly consider Michel de Montaigne’s essay on 
the force of  the imagination, which engages with many of  the issues raised in 
the preceding pages and which, moreover, is exactly contemporary with Bodin’s 
Démonomanie. While revising his essay, which first appeared in 1580, Montaigne 
could have taken into account both editions of  Bodin’s treatise, from 1580 and 
1587, as he deepened his reflections on credulity and possibility. In its primitive 
form, essay I, 21 “De la force de l’imagination” consists of  a series of  examples 
of  psychosomatic ailments where the imagination induces in the patient either the 
sensation of  malady or of  remedy. The last section turns to the sort of  phenomena 
that St. Augustine classifies under the heading of  inusitata, including an anecdote 
about the falconer who made a bird fall from the sky merely by staring at it, “à 
ce qu’on dit” (Montaigne 105), and which Montaigne reports without confirming 
or denying its veracity. He is not answerable for the truth of  his anecdotes: “Car 
les Histoires que j’emprunte, je les renvoye sur la conscience de ceux de qui je 
les prens” (Ibid.). When he revised his essay for the 1588 edition, Montaigne 
pursued this point a little further. The essayist is not concerned with the facts 
but rather with their interpretation or meaning: “Les discours sont à moy, et se 
tienent par la preuve de la raison, non de l’expérience: chacun y peut joindre ses 
exemples” (Ibid.). The essayist acknowledges responsibility for the discours but not 
the exemples.
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It is the final revision of  the essay, completed sometime before the author’s 
death in 1592, that takes the most provocative approach to all these questions. 
Here the author insists that he does not care if  his examples of  the power of  the 
imagination are true or false: “Aussi en l’estude que je traitte de noz moeurs et 
mouvemens, les tesmoignages fabuleux, pourveu qu’ils soient possibles, y servent 
comme les vrais. Advenu ou non advenu, à Paris ou à Rome, à Jean ou à Pierre, 
c’est tousjours un tour de l’humaine capacité, duquel je suis utilement advisé par 
ce recit” (Montaigne 105). The key distinction is not between real and fabulous 
but rather between possible and impossible. Therefore, he dismisses the objective 
question: are these stories really true, did they really happen, “advenu ou non 
advenu”? In effect, he dismisses literary criticism as enacted in the debate between 
Don Quijote and the Canon of  Toledo. He is not a literary critic adjudicating the 
boundaries of  romance and history. He creates his own genre, the essay, that situates 
itself  in relation to existing genres and genre theories. For instance, he recognizes 
two categories of  authors, of  which he identifies with the second category: “Il y 
a des autheurs, desquels la fin c’est dire les evenements. La mienne, si j’y sçavoye 
advenir, seroit dire sur ce qui peut advenir” (Ibid.). As Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani 
(86) pointed out long ago, this distinction matches rather closely the distinction 
that Aristotle draws between history and poetry in chapter nine of  his Poetics. 
Montaigne’s “evenements” corresponds to Aristotle’s τὰ γενόμενα (1451a36) or 
the facts while his own specialty, “ce qui peut advenir,” translates the realm of  
poetry, οἷα ἂν γένοιτο (1451a37). This affinity for poetry leads not to a confusion 
of  genres but rather to a seeming indifference to the effort to segregate fact from 
fiction.
In the same essay, the narrator confides that some people have encouraged him 
to write an impartial history of  his times (times tainted with indelible partisanship); 
but we already know that Montaigne is not suited for this task which prefers facts to 
possibilities. Moreover, history writing would compromise his independence and 
inhibit his free speech: “Aucuns me convient d’escrire les affaires de mon temps, 
estimant que je les voy d’une veue moins blessée de passion qu’un autre Mais ils 
ne disent pas que, pour la gloire de Salluste, je n’en prendroys pas la peine: ennemy 
juré d’obligation que ma liberté, estant si libre, j’eusse publié des jugemens, à mon 
gré mesme et selon raison, illegitimes et punissables” (Montaigne 106). Apparently, 
no one has urged him to take up poetry, and there are no surviving poems by 
Montaigne. Instead, the essay form indulges his freedom. Like fiction, the essay 
opens up the wide realm of  possibility, but Montaigne never confuses possibility 
with proof. He may agree with the Canon’s concession to Don Quijote that 
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anything is possible, but he cannot agree with Bodin that everyone is guilty. The 
essay draws us away from the “tribunal of  history” (Frisch 120) and the archaism 
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